dents to turn to except their own, because our Court alone exercised this sort of authority. When many new constitutional courts were created after the Second World War, these courts naturally looked to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, among other sources, for developing their own law. But now that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries . . . it [is] time the U.S. courts began looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process. 2 More recently, I must acknowledge, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed skepticism, if not downright disagreement, on the relevance of foreign law, both on human rights issues and on federalism questions-issues implicating the allocation of regulatory and decisionmaking authority between States and Nation in the United States. I will later refer to 21st-century dissenting opinions he joined criticizing comparative sideglances by the Court's majority. I note here, in contrast to recent misgivings, the view Justice Felix Frankfurter expressed half a century ago. Even on questions of federalism, he thought, an "island" or "lone ranger" mentality ought not prevail. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
While the distribution of powers between each national government and its parts varies, leading at times to different legal results, the problems faced by the United States Supreme Court under the Commerce Clause are not different in kind . . . from those which come before the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia. 3 Were he with us today, Justice Frankfurter might have included the European Court of Justice. Returning to my own perspective, while U.S. jurisprudence has evolved over the course of two centuries of constitutional adjudication, we are not so wise that we have nothing to learn from other democratic legal systems newer to judicial review for constitutionality. The point was well made by Judge Guido Calabresi, a former Dean of Yale Law School and now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (one of thirteen appellate courts in the U.S. federal court system). "Wise parents," Judge Calabresi said in a 1995 concurring opinion, "do not hesitate to learn from their children." In the value I place on comparative dialogue-on sharing with and learning from others-I am inspired by counsel from the founders of the United States. The drafters and signers of the Declaration of Independence cared about the opinions of other peoples; they placed before the world the reasons why the States, joining together to become the United States of America, were impelled to separate from Great Britain. The Declarants stated their reasons out of "a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind." 5 I should add, even in this audience, that the U.S. Declaration then endeavored, through a long list of grievances, to submit the "Facts"-the "long Train of [the British Crown's] Abuses"-to the scrutiny of "a candid World." 6 The U.S. Supreme Court, early on, expressed a complementary view: The judicial power of the United States, the Court said in 1816, was intended to include cases "in the correct adjudication of which foreign nations are deeply interested . . . [and] in which the principles of the law and comity of nations often form an essential inquiry."
7 "Far from [exhibiting hostility] to foreign countries' views and laws," Professor Vicki Jackson of the Georgetown University law faculty wrote last year, "the founding generation showed concern for how adjudication in our courts would affect other countries' regard for the United States."
8 Even more so today, the United States is subject to the scrutiny of "a candid World." What the United States does, for good or for ill, continues to be watched by the international community, in particular, by organizations concerned with the advancement of the "rule of law" and respect for human dignity.
The new turn-of-the-nineteenth-century United States looked outward not only to earn the respect of other nations. In writing the Constitution, the Framers were inspired by jurists and philosophers from other lands, and they understood that the new nation would be bound by "the Law of Nations," today called international law. Among powers granted the U.S. Congress, the Framers enumerated in Article I the power " [t] 
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Another trenchant critic, Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, commented last year: "To cite foreign law as authority is to flirt with the discredited . . . idea of a universal natural law; or to suppose fantastically that the world's judges constitute a single, elite community of wisdom and conscience."
16 Judge Posner's view rests, in part, on the concern that U.S. judges do not comprehend the social, historical, political, and institutional background from which foreign opinions emerge. Nor do we even understand the language in which laws and judgments, outside the common law realm, are written.
Judge Posner is right, of course, to this extent: Foreign opinions are not authoritative; they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge. But they can add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions. As to our ignorance of foreign legal systems, just as lawyers can learn from each other in multinational transactions and bar associations, judges, too, can profit from exchanges and associations with jurists elsewhere. Yes, we should approach foreign legal materials with sensitivity to our differences, deficiencies, and imperfect understanding, but imperfection, I believe, should not lead us to abandon the effort to learn what we can from the experience and good thinking foreign sources may convey. 24 (Even reference to a Scottish verdict, it seems, would be out of order.) The Acts further provide that any judge who refers to the proscribed materials shall be deemed to have committed an impeachable offense.
These measures recycle similar resolutions and bills proposed before the 2004 elections in the United States, but never put to a vote. Although I doubt the current measures will garner sufficient votes to pass, it is disquieting that they have attracted sizable support. And one not-so-small concern-they fuel the irrational fringe. A recent example. This is a huge threat to our Republic and Constitutional freedom. It is as much an assault on our liberty as anything ever has been . . . . If you are what you say you are, and NOT armchair patriots, then those two justices will not live another week.
More than two months have passed. Justice O'Connor, I am happy to report, remains alive and well. As for me, you can judge for yourself.
To a large extent, I believe, the critics in Congress and in the media misperceive how and why U.S. courts refer to foreign and international court decisions. The Washington Post, for example, worried in a March 25 editorial "about the implications for liberty and the democratic rights of the American people if the courts outsource America's constitutional tradition." 25 We refer to decisions rendered abroad, it bears repetition, not as controlling authorities, but for their indication, in Judge Wald's words, of "common denominators of basic fairness governing relationships between the governors and the governed." 26 Two decisions announced April 26, 2005, confounded those fearful about the U.S. Supreme Court's use of foreign court judgments to inform U.S. adjudication. One case involved a man convicted under a federal guncontrol law. Once convicted of a serious crime "in any court," the law prescribed, the former offender could not possess a firearm. 27 The defendant had been convicted in Japan for gun smuggling. Did "any court" mean any court in the world? Or should "any court" be read to mean any state or federal court in the United States? For good and sufficient reasons, Justice Breyer, writing for a majority that included Justice O'Connor and me, confined "any court" to those within our borders. Justice Scalia was among the dissenters. He would have counted the Japanese conviction. Justice Breyer has been billed as "perhaps the court's leading advocate of the idea that the Supreme Court needs to take greater notice of . . . legal opinions abroad." 28 Justice Scalia, as I earlier noted, takes strong issue with that view.
A similar division attended the Court's response to the question whether persons involved in a scheme to smuggle cheap liquor from Maryland into Canada, thereby evading Canada's hefty taxes on alcohol, could be prosecuted in the United States for wire fraud-using interstate telephone wires to accomplish the scheme. 29 of Canada's customs and tax laws was that country's prerogative, not ours. Both cases concerned the territorial range of U.S. laws. Recognizing that the legislature ordinarily thinks domestically is entirely compatible with the view that all involved in writing and interpreting laws would profit from knowledge of other systems' approaches and solutions to similar problems.
Professor Vicki Jackson noted a point critics of comparative sideglances perhaps overlook: the "negative authority" foreign experience may sometimes have. 30 She referred in this regard to the "Steel Seizure Case."
31 There, Justice Jackson, in his separate opinion, pointed to features of the Weimar Constitution in Germany that allowed Adolf Hitler to assume dictatorial powers. He contrasted Germany's situation with that of France and Great Britain, countries in which legislative authorization was required for the exercise of emergency powers. Justice Jackson drew from that comparison support for the conclusion that, without more specific congressional authorization, the U.S. President could not seize private property even in aid of a war effort.
The U.S. Constitution, Justice Scalia has noted, does not contain any instruction resembling South Africa's prescription. That nation's Constitution provides that courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, must consider international law, and may consider foreign law. Other post-World War II Constitutions, India's and Spain's, for example, have similar prescriptions.
I would demur to Justice Scalia's observation. Judges in the United States are free to consult all manner of commentary-Restatements, Treatises, what law professors or even law students write copiously in law reviews, for example. If we can consult those writings, why not the analysis of a question similar to the one we confront contained in an opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the German Constitutional Court, or the European Court of Human Rights? Israel's Chief Justice, Aharon Barak, had it right, I think, when he listed among questions on which comparative law inquiry could prove enlightening or valuable in a positive or negative sense: hate speech, privacy, abortion, the death penalty, and now the fight against terrorism.
A case in point well-known to this audience. Other opinions too, in that noteworthy decision, contain comparative references. One example: Baroness Hale, after noting that "Belmarsh is not the British Guantanamo Bay," quoted a passage on the protection of minority rights from Thomas Jefferson's first inaugural address. 34 Lord Bingham did make the observation, gently, that contemporary "U.S. authority does not provide evidence of general international practice." The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United States in grappling with hard questions, I earlier suggested, has a close kinship to the view of the U.S. Constitution as a document essentially frozen in time as of the date of its ratification. I am not a partisan of that view. U.S. jurists honor the Framers' intent "to create a more perfect Union," I believe, if they read the Constitution as belonging to a global 21st century, not as fixed forever by 18th-century understandings.
Justice At issue in that case, whether stripping a wartime deserter of citizenship violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments." "The basic concept underlying the . . . Amendment," the opinion observed, "is nothing less than the dignity of man." 41 Therefore the constitutional text "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 42 In that regard, the plurality reported: "The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime."
43
A fairly recent example of frozen-in-time interpretation is Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., a 1999 decision involving no grand constitutional question, simply equity between parties with no ideological score to settle. 44 The basic scenario: A Mexican company defaulted on payments due to a U.S. creditor and was sued in a Federal District Court, which had personal jurisdiction over the debtor. Sliding into insolvency, the Mexican company was busily distributing what remained of its assets to its Mexican creditors. It did so in clear violation of a contractual promise to treat the U.S. creditor on par with all other unsecured, unsubordinated creditors. Continuation of that activity would leave nothing in the till for the U.S. creditor.
Since 1975, British courts have been providing a remedy in similar circumstances. To assure that there will be assets against which a final judgment for the plaintiff creditor can be executed, courts in this country issued Mareva injunctions, named after a decision of the Court of Appeal by Lord Denning, M. R., approving the practice. 45 A Mareva injunction temporarily restrains a foreign debtor from transferring assets pending adjudication of the domestic creditor's claim. 39 Id. at 433. 40 [d] never been the practice of the English Courts to seize assets of a defendant in advance of judgment or to restrain the disposal of them." Noting "that the practice on the Continent of Europe is different," he concluded "that the time has come when we should revise our practice." Id. at 138.
A U.S. District Court, ruling over two decades after the leading U.K. decisions, looked to the Mareva injunction, which other common-law nations had by then adopted, and found it altogether fitting for the U.S. creditor's case against the Mexican debtor. The Court of Appeals agreed. But a 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Mareva injunctions were not "traditionally accorded by courts of equity" at the time the Constitution was adopted. 46 A power that English courts of equity "did not actually exercise . . . until 1975," the Court concluded, was not one U.S. courts could assume without congressional authorization. 47 Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, I dissented from the Court's static conception of equitable remedial authority. Earlier decisions described that authority as supple, adaptable to changing conditions. I noted, among other things, that federal courts, in their sometimes heroic efforts to implement the public school desegregation mandated by Brown v. Board of Education, did not embrace a frozen-in-time view of their equitable authority. Issuing decrees "beyond the contemplation of the 18th-century Chancellor," 48 they applied the enduring principles of equity to the changing needs of a society still in the process of achieving "a more perfect Union."
In Brown, I might note, apropos the respect due opinions of humankind, the Attorney General of the United States filed an amicus brief stressing the international importance of the case. The brief included a letter from then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Acheson observed:
[T]he continuance of racial discrimination in the United States remains a source of constant embarrassment to this Government in the day-to-day conduct of its foreign relations; and it jeopardizes the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democratic nations of the world. 49 Turning from frozen-in-time interpretation, I will take up another shortfall or insularity in current U.S. jurisprudence, at least as I see it. The Bill of Rights, few would disagree, is the hallmark and pride of the United States. One might therefore assume that it guides and controls U.S. officialdom wherever in the world they carry the flag of the United States or their credentials. But that is not the currently prevailing view. For example, absent an express ban by treaty, a U.S. officer may abduct a foreigner and forcibly transport him to the United States to stand trial. The Court so 46 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319. 47 Id. at 329. 48 Id. at 337. 49 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1).
held, 6-to-3, in 1992.
50 Just a year earlier, South Africa's Supreme Court of Appeal had ruled the other way. It determined that under South Africa's common law, a trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a case against a defendant when the State had acted lawlessly in apprehending him by participating in an abduction across international borders. 51 Another example, one in which I was a participant, involving civil litigation: Interpreting U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held in 1989, during my tenure on that court, that foreign plaintiffs acting abroad-plaintiffs were Indian family planning organizations-had no First Amendment rights, and therefore no standing to assert a violation of such rights by U.S. officials. 52 In particular, the Indian organizations complained of a condition on U.S. grant money: the recipients could not engage in any abortion counseling, even in a separate entity and with funds from other sources. In dissent, I resisted the notion that in an encounter between the United States and nonresident aliens, "the amendment we prize as 'first' has no force in court." 53 [I]n a world of states, the United States is not in a position to secure the rights of all individuals everywhere, [but] it is always in a position to respect them. Our federal government must not invade the individual rights of any human being. The choice in the Bill of Rights of the word "person" rather than "citizen" was not fortuitous; nor was the absence of a geographical limitation. Both reflect a commitment to respect the individual rights of all human beings. 55 Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) held unconstitutional the execution of a mentally retarded offender. 56 The Court noted that "within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations 56 65 Ruling some six months before the Lords' decision in the Belmarsh case, the Court held, 8-to-1, that the petitioner was entitled, at least, to a fair opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention. Even in "our most challenging and uncertain moments" when "our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested," Justice O'Connor wrote for a four-Justice plurality, "we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad." 66 "[H]istory and common sense," she reminded, "teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse . . ." 67 That point received eloquent statement in Lord Hoffman's opinion in the Belmarsh case.
The other "enemy combatant" case, Rasul v. Bush, held that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured in hostilities abroad, then transported to the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
68 Lord Steyn, before this decision, called Guantánamo a "legal black hole." 69 The Supreme Court has so far written only chapter one on the Guantánamo Bay incarcerations. Federal district court judges have split on chapter two. One judge held that foreigners detained at Guantánamo Bay, though they had access to court, could gain no judicial relief. 70 Another ruled that the detainees were enti-In this regard, I was impressed by an observation made in September 2003 by Israel's Chief Justice Barak. September 11, he noted, confronts the United States with the dilemma of conducting a war on terrorism without sacrificing the nation's most cherished values, including our respect for human dignity. "We in Israel," Barak said, "have our September 11, and September 12 and so on."
80 He spoke of his own Court's efforts to balance the government's no doubt compelling need to secure the safety of the State and of its citizens on the one hand, and the nation's high regard for "human dignity and freedom on the other hand." He referred, particularly, to a question presented to his Court: "Is it lawful to use violence (less euphemistically, torture) in interrogat 83 Parliament, you no doubt know, reacted swiftly to the Lords' decision by enacting in March a measure allowing placement of terrorist suspects under a highly restrictive form of house arrest, in lieu of imprisonment, again without charging or trying them.
We live in an age in which the fundamental principles to which we subscribe-liberty, equality, and justice for all-are encountering extraordi- nary challenges. But it is also an age in which we can join hands with others who hold to those principles and face similar challenges. May we draw inspiration from Abigail Adams, who wrote to her son, the future President, of the era in which he was coming of age:
These are the times in which a genius would wish to live. It is not in the still calm of life, or the repose of a pacific station, that great characters are formed. The habits of a vigorous mind are formed in contending with difficulties. 
